Proof Holdings

Add a pending member to a Circle by name, with an optional pre-declared WhatsApp phone. The Telegram chat id is captured later when the member taps the enrollment deep link. Agent usage: after adding a member, call invite_circle_member to mint the single-use enrollment link the member taps to bind their messenger identity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Declare a channel for a Circle member. Returns 409 if that channel type already exists on the member. The identifier is a Telegram chat id or an E.164 WhatsApp phone (per-channel format validated server-side). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Add a new domain to verify ownership. Optionally specify email sending intent and verification method. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Add an additional DNS provider for verification to an already-verified domain. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Cancel a pending verification request. Only the creator can cancel. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Cancel a pending verification request. Only pending requests can be cancelled. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Check if stored DNS credentials have access to a domain. Use before triggering verification to confirm the credentials work. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Check the email sending setup status for a domain, including DNS record configuration progress. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Check the status of a pending domain verification. Triggers a DNS/HTTP check and returns the updated status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Trigger a check on the domain verification challenge. Call after placing DNS record or HTTP file. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Claim a unique username for the authenticated user's public profile. Usernames must be 3-30 characters, alphanumeric and underscores only. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Confirm domain email verification by submitting the code sent to the corporate email address. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Connect a Cloudflare API token to a domain for automated DNS record management. Note: the API token will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Connect a generic DNS provider to a domain using provider-specific credentials. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Connect GoDaddy API credentials to a domain for automated DNS record management. Note: the API key and secret will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Create an account-bootstrap session for agent-driven onboarding. Public endpoint (no API key required). Returns a session id, channel-specific instructions, and — FOR TELEGRAM AND WHATSAPP ONLY — deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG) and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR). The endpoint is safe to call regardless of whether the submitted identity is new: completing verification transparently creates a User when none exists, or logs the user in when one already does. The response is intentionally uniform — the server does NOT reveal whether the identity is already registered (this would be a user-enumeration oracle). If the agent needs to distinguish new-vs-returning users, call `get_current_user` after verification and inspect the user's `created_at`. EMAIL CHANNEL SENDS NOTHING HERE. The response carries email_sent=false and send_required=true: confirm with the user that the address is theirs, then call send_account_email. The other channels dispatch nothing either way — the user sends the first message themselves (reverse OTP). Agent usage: (1) Call create_account with the user's chosen channel. (2) For email, confirm with the user and call send_account_email. On telegram/whatsapp pass `deep_link` to render_auth_link, which returns the clickable link with a QR code beneath it to you. On sms `deep_link` is an EMPTY STRING and render_auth_link will reject it — show `sms_message`, which is what the user sends; this response carries no destination number, so do not invent one. Do not hand `qr_text` to a link renderer either — it is the link already rendered as QR art; print it verbatim inside a fenced code block if a real terminal needs the QR. (3) Once your reply shows the user the challenge, call wait_for_account_creation with the session id until verification completes. On email the user must press "Sign in the browser that requested this" on the link's page — "Sign in here" signs in the browser they clicked from, and the wait then ends with "completed_elsewhere". (4) On verified, JWT + refresh cookies are set; proceed with whatever follow-up the agent was asked to do. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox.

Create a new API key. The secret key value is returned ONLY in this response — store it securely. Note: the secret will be visible in the AI conversation context. Optionally bind the key to a sub-account via profile_id — outbound messages sent with the key are then branded as that sub-account. Agent usage: This operation requires 2FA. Before calling, complete the 2FA flow: (1) call start_2fa with action_type "api_key_create" and the user's preferred channel, (2) tell the user a code was sent and wait for them to verify, (3) poll get_2fa_status until status is "verified", (4) then call create_api_key — the backend session will be elevated. If you get a 403, the 2FA session has expired — restart the flow. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Create a new authorization request. Authorizations grant permission to send confirmations to a user via a specific channel. The user must approve the authorization before confirmations can be sent. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a Telegram chat ID discovery token. Returns a deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). The user opens the link in Telegram, which reveals their chat ID for HITL config setup. Agent usage: pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can click or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that same link already rendered as QR art. Print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. Then poll poll_chat_id_discovery with the returned token until the chat_id appears. Use the discovered chat_id when creating a HITL config with a Telegram channel. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a Circle — a named group of trusted contacts (the people-primitive powering Proof-Me and Approvals-on-Circle). Optionally seed initial members; each member's declared channels are stored so they can be invited to enroll. Agent usage: after creating a Circle, add members with add_circle_member (or seed them here), then invite_circle_member to mint the enrollment deep link each contact taps to bind their messenger identity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Fire an on-demand Proof-Me drill against one enrolled member — a real cross-channel identity challenge carrying the scheduled-safety-check label (the account owner practices confirming). Complements the automated daily drill + monthly reinforcement sweeps. On Pay as you go a live key is refused `422 plan_upgrade_required`; a test key is not, and its drill reaches the member on Telegram only (`400 no_channel` when they have no verified Telegram channel). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a HITL confirmation request. Sends an approval request to the channels configured on the referenced HITL config. First response wins. Agent usage: The HITL config referenced by hitl_id must be authorized before you can create confirmations. If this returns a 403 or "not authorized" error, call request_hitl_authorization on the HITL config first, then wait for the user to approve via the messaging channel. After creating a confirmation, poll get_confirmation to check for approval/denial, or, if the user (the HITL config owner) will decide it themselves, use get_confirmation_approval_link for their own approval link. Encryption is NOT optional: a HITL config cannot send confirmations without a keypair, the human approves by decrypting in their browser, and `message` must be a JSON ciphertext envelope. Plaintext is refused with 400 `message_not_encrypted`; an envelope sealed to another key with 400 `message_key_mismatch`. Choose the version by who must be able to decrypt: - v1 (single-recipient): wraps the content key for the config owner only. Use ONLY when there are no enrolled non-owner approvers — with approvers enrolled it is refused with 400 `envelope_missing_approvers`. - v2 (multi-recipient): additionally wraps the content key for each enrolled approver via an `approver_ek` map, so every approver can decrypt. Build it with the SDK `encryptMessageV2(plaintext, ownerPublicKey, hitlId, approverKeys)` after fetching the approvers via the SDK `getApproverKeys(hitlId)` (`GET /api/v1/hitl/:id/approver-keys`). AAD is the `hitlId`. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a delegation (Proof of Delegation): a control-proven domain authorizes a typed url/purl artifact and receives a publishable signed token. The attestation is that the domain's controller authorized this artifact — nothing more; it says nothing about the artifact or the business behind it. Each mint is a billable proof. A requested lifetime longer than the control proof's remainder is rejected, never truncated. The result carries the publishable token AND the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid — the same pair the list and get tools return, so the shape does not depend on which verb produced it. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Store DNS provider credentials for automated domain verification. Note: credentials will be visible in the AI conversation context. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Create a HITL (Human-in-the-Loop) config. Defines which messaging channels receive approval requests and the default timeout. Agent usage: After creating a HITL config, you must call request_hitl_authorization before it can be used with create_confirmation. For Telegram channels, use create_chat_id_discovery first to discover the user's chat ID, then include it in the channel config. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a Proof-Me cross-channel identity challenge (CONFIRM) for an enrolled Circle member. The account holder approves/denies on a channel different from the one the suspicious contact reached the member on. Agent usage: poll get_identity_challenge with the returned ID until it leaves pending (confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired or revoked). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a multi-channel phone verification: one phone number challenged over several channels at once (OR / first-wins). The first channel the user completes wins, yields a single proof token, and cancels the losing siblings. Exactly one proof is billed, at the winning channel's completion — not one per channel, and nothing at creation. Agent usage: the response includes a `group_id` (format vg_<hex>) and a `channels` array — each block carries a `deep_link` (WhatsApp/Telegram) or an `sms_message` to present to the user — pass the `deep_link` to render_auth_link. A block's `qr_text` is that same link already rendered as QR art, not an alternative address: print it verbatim inside a fenced code block or leave it out. Poll get_multi_channel_verification_status with the group_id to track completion and retrieve the proof token when a channel verifies. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a new profile with optional display name, bio, avatar, business info, email branding (theme, support email), and theme settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a new phone verification session. Returns deep_link, qr_code (base64 PNG), and qr_text (UTF-8 text QR for terminal display). Sessions provide a hosted verification flow with callbacks. Agent usage: After creating a session, pass the response's `deep_link` to render_auth_link so the user can open or scan it. Never hand `qr_text` to a link renderer — it is that link already rendered as QR art. Print it verbatim inside a fenced code block only when a real terminal needs the QR. On sms the person texts a short code from the number being proven, as in SMS login: `deep_link` is an `sms:` link to our default number with the message pre-filled, so render it the same way, and also show `sms_message` (what they send) with the numbers in `sms_dids` (one per region, each with its own QR), because a person reading on a computer texts from their phone. They get no reply SMS. An SMS proof can still be revoked about a minute after the session completes, if the delayed spoof check finds the sender was not a real mobile line, so before relying on it check it with validate_proof. Then use wait_for_session to poll until the session reaches a terminal state (verified, failed, or expired). The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a new verification request to ask another user to share verified assets. Each asset is an object naming its type, e.g. { "type": "email" }. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Create a new identity verification. Initiates a verification flow for an asset identifier (phone number, email, domain, social handle, wallet address, account, or Telegram bot). Agent usage: pass the asset `type`, the delivery `channel`, and the `identifier` (e.g. type "phone", channel "sms", identifier "+37060000000"; or type "email", channel "email", identifier "user@example.com"). The response carries a `challenge` object with the instruction for the chosen channel — except a `telegram_bot` verification made with a LIVE key, which the server completes on the spot and answers with `status: verified` plus a proof token and no challenge at all; with a `pk_test_` key that same call stays pending and does carry a challenge. On the messenger channels it also carries `challenge.deep_link` — pass THAT to render_auth_link to give the user a clickable link and a QR code. This endpoint returns no `qr_text` at all. For OTP-based flows (sms/email), the user receives a code — poll get_verification or use wait_for_verification to track completion. For Telegram/WhatsApp, the user clicks the deep link to verify. The user does not see tool results — most clients fold them away, render_auth_link's output included. Before you wait or poll, put what the user must act on into your own reply text: the link itself (not a sentence announcing it), the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Create a multi-asset verification request. Allows verifying multiple assets (phone, email, domain, social, wallet, account, telegram_bot) in a single flow. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Add a webhook endpoint. An event reaches every active endpoint whose scope includes the event's sub-account and whose events match; an account-level event reaches "all"-scope endpoints only. An account still delivering to the single webhook URL in its settings is moved onto endpoints by this call (that URL becomes an "all"-scope endpoint with the same secret and events). The response carries the endpoint's signing secret — this and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret are the only times it is returned, so store it now. Deliveries carry an HMAC-SHA256 X-Proof-Signature over "<X-Proof-Timestamp>.<body>" made with it. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Archive a Circle (soft delete — sets status to archived). It stops appearing in the default list but is recoverable via list_circles with status="archived". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Delete a stored DNS provider credential. Domains using this credential will need new credentials for automated verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Remove a domain from the account. Revokes every proof of the domain and every delegation issued from it (for good — re-adding the domain does not bring them back), deletes the domain and its records, and removes our _proof TXT record and the Resend sending domain where we can; the response lists what is left for you to remove by hand. Owner only, in a start_login session, with one code: start_2fa_for_action with action_type domain_remove and targets [this domain id]. Need only a fresh proof? Revoke the proofs instead (revoke_asset), which keeps the domain. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Delete a domain verification attempt that is not verified (pending, verifying or failed) — nothing is revoked. A verified domain, or one that needs re-verification, is refused with domain_verified: removing it revokes its proofs and every delegation issued from it, which is delete_domain in a start_login session (or the dashboard). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Delete (archive) a HITL config. Sets status to archived. Cannot be used for new confirmations after deletion. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Delete the encryption keypair from a HITL config. WARNING: Existing ciphertexts will become permanently unreadable. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Delete a sub-account (profile). Revokes its API keys, archives the HITL setups and declines the pending requests created with its own keys, keeps its history but unlinks it, deletes its message templates, and retires its username for good. The last sub-account cannot be deleted; deleting the primary sub-account makes the oldest remaining one primary (the response names it). In a start_login session: one code first — start_2fa_for_action with action_type profile_delete and targets [this sub-account id]. With an API key alone only an EMPTY sub-account (no API keys, HITL setups or pending requests) can be deleted; anything else answers owner_session_required. archive_default_linked is deliberately not offered here: archiving or cancelling everything linked only by default is an irreversible fan-out, so archive each item explicitly instead. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Delete a sub-account's custom template, reverting that sub-account to the default template for the channel and message type. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Delete a webhook endpoint. It receives no new events; deliveries already queued to it are still attempted, signed with the secret they were queued with. Cannot be undone. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Export authorizations as CSV or JSON. Supports date range and status filtering. Maximum 10,000 records. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Export a complete copy of your account's data (GDPR Articles 15 and 20), or check on one. Owner only: sign in with start_login first (a connection with only an API key is refused user_session_required). The first call starts the export; it is prepared in the background, and the account owner is told by email (or on their login channel) with a link that downloads it only while they are signed in — this tool never returns the data itself. Call again to see whether it is ready: an export already preparing or ready is reported instead of starting another. One new export per 24 hours (no limit while the account is scheduled for deletion); the file is kept for 7 days. Pass export_id to read one export's status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Extend the expiration time of a pending verification request. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Check the status of a 2FA session by session ID. Returns whether the challenge has been completed, is pending, or has expired. Agent usage: Poll this after calling start_2fa. Check every few seconds. Terminal states: "verified" (proceed with protected operation), "expired" (restart with start_2fa). While "pending", the user has not yet entered their code. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Check the status of an in-progress email addition by session ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Check the status of an in-progress phone addition by session ID. Poll until terminal state. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get per-API-key usage for a given key id: verification counts by type/channel/status, plus verification-request/confirmation/authorization totals, and attribution context (attribution_cutoff_at, attributed_fraction). The counts cover the key and every key it replaced (api_key.replaced_key_ids). Counts only — no recipient identifiers. Scoped to the authenticated account; an API-key caller may read only its own key. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get a single verified asset by ID. Returns details including type, value, status, and verification timestamps. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get an authorization by ID. Returns the current state of the authorization including status and usage statistics. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the prepaid balance (in euro cents and mills), the low-balance threshold, the top-up amounts on offer and the auto top-up setting. Proofs past the plan's included amount are drawn from this balance; once billing is live, an account whose balance is at or below zero is refused new proof requests (402 balance_empty) until it tops up. billing_enabled says whether billing is live. Topping up and changing auto top-up are done by the owner in the dashboard. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a Circle by ID. Returns the Circle including its members and per-member channel presence booleans (an identifier is NEVER returned — SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a confirmation by ID. Returns the full confirmation including status, response, and proof token. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the approval link of the HITL config owner: it is decided with the config's own key, so it is for the owner to approve or deny the confirmation themselves. An approver cannot use it — an approver's link goes only to their own channel, and "Send again" (`POST /api/v1/confirmations/{id}/resend`, which no tool calls yet) is what sends it there again. Every call returns the same owner link until "Send again" reaches the owner; "Send again" replaces it, and the next call returns a new one. Calling this tool again cancels nothing, so it is safe to call again to show the link again. The link expires when the confirmation does. Only works for pending confirmations. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the signed-in user's account details, plan and settings. Needs a login session: call start_login, then wait_for_login until it reports success. An API key alone cannot read this — for the key's own account use get_self_api_key or get_settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get the default message templates — one for each channel and message type a message is actually sent for. These are the built-in templates a sub-account sends when it has no custom template of its own. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get one of your delegations by Mongo id or ph_dlg_* handle. Returns the stored publishable token plus the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid — the delegation is only as live as the control proof it stands on (a revoked, suspended or expired domain proof invalidates it) and never outlives its own expires_at, whichever comes first. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the current token of an active delegation by its public ph_dlg_* handle — after a signing-key rotation, the re-signed token to publish in place of the old one. Public endpoint — no API key required, since the token is already published with the delegation. Any handle that is not an active delegation (revoked, suspended, expired or unknown) answers the same not_found.

Get metadata for all supported DNS providers, including required credential fields and documentation links. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get details of a specific domain by ID, including verification status, DNS records, and provider connections. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get a HITL config by ID. Returns the config including channels, timeout, and status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the encryption keypair for a HITL config. With `hitl:read` it returns the public key, encrypted private key, KDF salt, and key ID (kid). A key holding `confirmations:create` without `hitl:read` receives only `public_key` and `kid` — what a confirmation message is sealed to, never the private-key material. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a Proof-Me identity challenge by ID. Returns its status (pending, confirmed, denied, cancelled, failed, expired, revoked or suspended), the channel the CONFIRM ran on, and — once the person being checked decided — the proof token and its proof_id. Poll this for resolution. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the status of a multi-channel verification group by its group_id. Returns the aggregate status (pending/verified/expired), the winning_channel once one completes, per-channel statuses, and the proof token (with expires_at) when the group is verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the current user's primary profile. Returns profile details, theme, custom links, and public proof display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a one-call account snapshot: quota with end-of-month projection, request health (pending/completed/expired counts + success rate), per-channel completion rates, HITL counts, and active API key count. The same data the dashboard home renders. The hitl_channels sub-object requires the hitl:read scope. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a specific profile by ID. Returns full profile details including theme, custom links, and verification display settings. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get available verified assets that can be displayed on the user's profile. Returns assets eligible for public proof display. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the status of a proof by its public handle (ph_ctl_* / ph_dlg_*) or a verification ID. Returns whether the proof is active, suspended, expired, or revoked — a live proof reads "active". ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the current token of a proof you own, by its public ph_ctl_* handle. After a signing-key rotation this is the re-signed token, which replaces any older copy you hold. Each read is audited. A revoked or expired proof answers proof_not_live; a suspended one is still served. The proof of one of the account's own verified assets (a domain, phone or email verified on the account itself) answers owner_session_required here whatever its status (with a live key; a test key gets not_found): this tool sends the API key, and such a token is read by the signed-in owner in the dashboard. A key bound to a sub-account reads only that sub-account's proofs; another's answers not_found. For a delegation (ph_dlg_*) use get_delegation_token or get_delegation instead. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a verification request by its reference ID (your unique identifier). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get proof tokens for verified assets in a verification request. Returns proof tokens that can be used for offline verification. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the calling API key's own redacted metadata (id, name, key_prefix, environment, scopes, last_used_at, revoked_at, created_at) for agent self-inspection. Never returns the key hash or full secret. Requires API-key auth — a JWT session has no single-key context (returns 400 api_key_required). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a session by ID. Returns the session status, verification details, and proof token if verified. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get account settings: the outbound webhook endpoint with its event subscriptions, and the default proof lifetime. Branding (name, logo, colour, email theme, support email) belongs to each sub-account: read it with get_profile. The webhook signing secret is NOT returned to an API key — the response reports webhook.secret_set instead, and the value itself is visible only in the dashboard or in the update_settings response that created or rotated it. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the current subscription details including plan, status, billing period, and usage limits. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the template a sub-account sends for a channel and message type: its custom template if set (scope "project"), otherwise the default (scope "default"). The response names the sub-account in profile_id. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get usage metrics for the authenticated account. Shows verification counts, API calls, and quota usage. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get the current status of a domain verification session, including challenge details. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

Get a verification by ID. Returns the full verification object including status, channel, and proof token if verified. Before calling this for a challenge you created, make sure your reply text already shows the user what to act on — the link itself, the SMS text and number, or a note to check their inbox; a link that appeared only in a tool result is one they never saw. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a verification request by ID. Returns the request with all its asset verification statuses. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get a single verified user and their verifications by external user ID. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get details of a single webhook delivery attempt including request/response payloads and retry history. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get one webhook endpoint by ID. The signing secret is not returned (only create_webhook_endpoint and rotate_webhook_endpoint_secret return it). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Get webhook delivery statistics including total deliveries, success/failure counts, and recent activity. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

Mint a single-use enrollment invite for a Circle member. Returns Telegram + WhatsApp deep links and a QR code; the member taps the channel-matched link to bind their messenger identity to the Circle. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List all API keys for the authenticated account. Returns key metadata (not the secret key values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

List all verified assets for the authenticated user. Assets are verified identities (phones, emails, domains). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List the current user's signed-in devices: every session that can still renew, idle ones included. Each shows its channel, user agent and expires_at, which is when the session stops being able to renew (not when its current access token expires). When called via API key, no session is marked is_current. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List authorizations with optional filters. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List the prepaid balance history, newest first: every top-up, refund and adjustment, and one usage row per month for that month's deductions. Amounts are signed euro cents (credits positive). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List a Circle member's channels. Returns channel metadata only (channel, status, verified_at) — an identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List a Circle's members. Each member carries channel-presence booleans (has_telegram / has_whatsapp) and the masked phone they enrolled from (enrolled_phone_hint, e.g. +9••••••4171) — a full identifier is NEVER returned (SEC-PM-006). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List Circles with optional filters. Archived Circles are excluded by default; pass status="archived" to surface them. Returns paginated results. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List confirmations with optional filters. Returns paginated results with status, HITL config and sub-account (profile_id) filtering. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List your own delegations with optional filters. Each item carries the DERIVED effective_status/is_valid beside its stored status — read effective_status, since status records only whether the owner revoked the delegation themselves, so a delegation still reads active there after its domain control proof was revoked, suspended or expired, and after its OWN lifetime ran out. effective_status accounts for all of those: it reports expired once either lifetime has passed, whichever is earlier. Tokens are not included in the list — use get_delegation for the stored token. There is no public enumeration of third-party delegations. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), then call this tool again. start_login does NOT open this tool.

List all stored DNS provider credentials for the authenticated account. Returns credential metadata (not secret values). ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

List all domains for the authenticated account. Returns domain metadata including verification status. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.

List all email addresses associated with the authenticated account. ACCESS: needs a Proof account. Authenticate this client (Claude Code: /mcp → Authenticate), or sign in with start_login — a session opens this tool — then call this tool again.