com.oceanalt/aml

File your operator's control-baseline attestation — the counterpart to counterparty_control_baseline. That tool asks what controls the OTHER side runs; this one publishes what YOUR side runs, so payers can see it before settling with you. No account, no key, one call. Gaps are allowed and expected: answer false where a control is not in place and describe how you plan to close it in gapPlan. A filing with declared gaps is worth far more than no filing — it lets a payer decide against a known shape instead of a blank. Get the control ids from the baseline list first. Only file for a party you are actually authorised to speak for.

Fetch the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline: the list of controls an agent operator is expected to run before it is allowed to move money, each answerable yes or no. Call this before attest_control_baseline so you file against real control ids. Each control carries which gate enforces it and why it exists.

Anti blind-signing. EVM: decodes what a transaction's calldata will actually do (ERC-20 transfer/approve/permit, setApprovalForAll, ownership transfer, native transfer). Solana: decodes a whole base64 transaction (SPL Token / Token-2022 Transfer, TransferChecked, Approve, SetAuthority, CloseAccount, Burn; System Transfer / Assign; ATA creation). Compares it with what you believe you are doing. EVM: pass intent:{action:'pay', to, amount} plus contract (the transaction's to) and data (hex calldata). Solana: pass network:'solana' and transaction (base64) instead of data. decision match = does what you declared; mismatch = different recipient/amount/asset, or an approval / authority change instead of a payment — do not sign; unknown = could not decode (including address-lookup-table accounts), which is not the same as safe.

Call this before paying because an email, invoice or chat message asked you to. Pass what you received: raw headers if you have them, the From line, subject and body (or body_html), and the payee address if you already extracted one. OceanAlt checks whether the sender is who it claims to be (SPF/DKIM/DMARC results, a display name that names another domain, Reply-To sent elsewhere), whether the sender domain or any link imitates a brand or is a known phishing host, whether the payee address is listed or differs from previous_pay_to, and whether the text pressures the reader, announces changed payment details, or carries instructions aimed at an AI. Returns allow | review | decline with findings. On decline, do not pay from this message; confirm through a channel you already trust. The text is processed in memory and not stored. Free, no API key.

Answers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something. Returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets that must NOT be conflated: verified_by_oceanalt (enforced by the gateway on every payment — provable) and self_claimed (what they state about their own side — NOT verified by OceanAlt). Most parties have not attested: found:false means no information, not a bad signal.

Use when you need a record you can keep or hand to someone else, for example when a reviewer, auditor or counterparty asks why a payment to this address was allowed or refused. Returns everything OceanAlt holds about an address as public facts, in one Ed25519-signed bundle you can verify offline: screening verdict with evidence and freshness, profile signals, one-hop relations to listed addresses, fulfillment receipt stats and coverage. The response includes the signature and the key URL (https://oceanalt.com/.well-known/oceanalt-keys.json) to verify it. A witness, not a prosecutor: no conclusions about people. For a pay / do-not-pay answer, call payment_decision instead. Same as GET https://oceanalt.com/api/evidence/bundle. Free, no API key.

The receiving side's check before settlement. Given the payee's registry id (sid) and, optionally, the payer, amount and purpose, returns accept / decline / hold_request_info / not_ready with reason codes, the fields to request, evidence and a signature. Rule-based, not a model's opinion. Same logic as POST https://oceanalt.com/api/payee/decide.

Call before sending funds, buying a service, settling an invoice or answering an x402 payment quote. Pass the payee address (to) and network to get allow | review | decline, evidence and retry semantics. Only an explicit allow passes this risk check; review, decline, missing or unknown decisions and errors are not permission to pay. This tool does not transfer funds or grant payment authorization. A signed receipt or attestation records the decision, including review; a valid signature does not turn review into approval or prove settlement. If a receipt is returned, its Ed25519 signature can be verified with the public key at https://oceanalt.com/.well-known/oceanalt-keys.json. Pass resource_url to check the origin's payment quote against the payee; a different payee or an unavailable check raises the decision to review. A match is not an endorsement of the seller. Free within the monthly allowance; no signup or key is required to start. Anonymous allowance exhaustion is an error, not a risk decision.

Return a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and scam/phishing — each with its source category and reason. Takes no arguments. Free, no API key.

Use when another AI agent asks you to pay it, or wants to pay you, and you have its agent id: this tells you who is accountable for that agent. Resolves the chain agent -> principal -> mandate -> credential -> wallet. Each link reports whether it holds; completeness counts how many do (a factual count, not a score). Wherever the chain breaks is where accountability stops. Publication is opt-in and only posture is exposed (that a spending ceiling exists, never its value), so found:false means the agent has not published — absence of information, not a bad signal; fall back to payment_decision. This checks the agent, not the address: to check the payee address itself, call payment_decision or screen_address. Free, no API key.

Run an AML compliance screen on a single blockchain address BEFORE paying or receiving from it — the pre-payment check on a counterparty. Checks OFAC sanctions, known mixers, scam and phishing lists, stablecoin issuer freezes, and on-chain heuristics. Returns a verdict (clear | caution | risky), a 0–100 risk score, a blocked flag, and the matching signals — receipts, not a black-box score. A clear verdict means nothing was found in the data OceanAlt holds; it is not a statement that the address is safe. Depth varies by chain (see coverage.chains at /.well-known/agent-capabilities). Supports EVM (0x…), Tron (T…), Solana, Bitcoin and XRP Ledger (r…); Monero, Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin (ltc1) and BNB Beacon (bnb1) by list matching only. Free, no API key.

Screen a payment ENDPOINT (URL or domain) before calling it — the half that address screening cannot answer. In x402 the agent discovers a URL first, receives a 402, and only then learns where to pay: if that endpoint is spoofed, the payee address it hands back is freshly generated and appears on no sanctions list. Checks the hostname and its parent domains against phishing-domain intelligence plus hostname shape signals (bare IP, punycode homograph, deep subdomain nesting, free hosting). Returns clear | caution | risky | unknown with language-independent signal_keys. A clear verdict means no match was found, NOT that the endpoint is safe — freshly registered phishing hosts always precede any list. Use together with screen_address. Free, no API key.

Before paying an x402 402 response, check that its payment requirements (payTo, amount, asset, network, resource) were signed by the seller and not altered in transit by a proxy, CDN, SDK or another tool. x402 v2 carries the requirements in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header (base64 JSON): pass either the decoded JSON or the raw base64 value as body. Optionally pass expect:{payTo, amount} — the address and amount you are about to pay — and the tool also checks they match what was signed. verified:false with reason_code no_signature means the seller does not sign (unprotected, not necessarily malicious); digest_mismatch or signature_invalid means the response was tampered with — do not pay.