BlackVeil DNS & Email Security Scanner

Measure whether a domain's DNS security posture improved or regressed by comparing the current state against a prior scan snapshot. Returns a drift classification (improving/stable/regressing/mixed), score delta, and lists of improvements and regressions. Use to answer "did our security score improve or regress since last time?" — distinct from compare_baseline which checks compliance against a fixed policy (not improvement over time).

Compute a composite email spoofability risk score (0–100, higher = more spoofable) by combining SPF trust surface, DMARC enforcement, and DKIM coverage. Returns a risk level (minimal→critical), per-control sub-scores, and plain-language summary of how easy it would be to spoof email from the domain. Use when asked how easy it is to spoof email from a domain, or for a composite email spoofing risk score.

Bulk-scan up to 10 domains in parallel. Runs a full security audit on each domain in the list and returns score, NIST-aligned letter grade (6-band A+/A/B/C/D/F), and finding counts per domain. Use when you want to audit multiple domains at once or do a bulk scan of several domains simultaneously — distinct from compare_domains which does a side-by-side analysis of 2–5 domains. Version stamps (hoisted once per batch): 'scoringModelVersion' is the scoring POLICY semver and is INDEPENDENT of 'dnsChecksPackageVersion', the @blackveil/dns-checks npm engine-package version — the model version legitimately lags and the two must not be compared. Record 'scoringConfigHash' when citing scores.

Fetch owner-scoped findings for a completed asynchronous batch scan.

Start a durable asynchronous scan of 1–10 domains. Returns a stable job ID; replaying the same idempotency key with the same principal, normalized inputs, and scoring versions returns the same job.

Read the owner-scoped status of an asynchronous batch scan.

Enqueue an async brand audit across up to 50 target domains with optional standard/deep discovery depth, brand aliases, and caller-supplied candidate domains. Returns { auditId, queuedAt, targetCount, etaSeconds } immediately; poll with brand_audit_status and fetch results with brand_audit_get_report once complete. Each target consumes 1 unit of the monthly BRAND_AUDIT_QUOTAS budget.

Fetch the result JSON for a completed brand audit. With `target` set, returns the per-target CheckResult; without, returns the audit-level aggregate. Returns notReady when polling an in-flight audit. When a rendered PDF sidecar exists, metadata includes pdfUrl — an authenticated /reports/ download link (same bearer credential as this call). Completed targets whose PDF is still rendering include pdfPending so callers can poll again.

Run a full brand audit on a single target with optional standard/deep discovery depth, brand aliases, and caller-supplied candidate domains. Discovers brand-related domains, looks up registrar + registrant for each candidate, and classifies each into consolidated, real registrar-sprawl shadowIt, authorized vendor dependency, indeterminate, or impersonation relationships. Gated tier-wide by monthly BRAND_AUDIT_QUOTAS (free/agent=0, developer=50, partner=200, enterprise=500, owner=unlimited).

Poll the status of an enqueued brand audit. Returns audit-level status (queued | running | completed | failed), progress 'N/M', and per-target statuses. Owner-scoped — auditIds owned by other principals surface as notFound.

Assess the security posture of IETF BANDAID agent-discovery records (draft-mozleywilliams-dnsop-dnsaid). Detects SVCB agent records under _agents, _index._{protocol}._agents and _{protocol}._agents, reports whether the discovery zone is DNSSEC-anchored (unsigned = spoofable agent endpoints), evaluates DANE/TLSA binding trust (RFC 6698 §10.1), and checks capability-document integrity (cap / cap-sha256). Read-only; uses Private-Use SVCB param code points pending IANA assignment.

Measure authoritative DNS infrastructure posture for a hostname over direct DNS-over-TCP/53 from a single vantage: TCP/53 reachability, the authoritative AA flag, recursion exposure, SOA serial consistency across nameservers, DNSKEY/RRSIG presence (not validation), IPv4/IPv6 answer parity, and unsupported-query handling — plus, for authenticated callers, a zone-transfer refusal test (first response only, no zone data retrieved) and CHAOS version.bind/id.server disclosure. Reports UDP/53 reachability, amplification, EDNS large-response/truncation, DNS cookies/RRL, BGP origin, RPKI, route-leak signals, anycast diversity, vantage latency, and RIR/RDAP as inconclusive — none of those are measured. Uses BV_INFRA_PROBE when available.

Check the BIMI brand-logo record at default._bimi.<domain>. Validates the logo URL (l=) and the presence of mark-certificate authority evidence (a=) — the a= tag is a bare URL, so the certificate type (VMC or CMC) is not determined — and verifies the DMARC enforcement prerequisite (p=quarantine/reject) that mail clients require before displaying a BIMI logo. Returns findings for a missing/malformed record or unmet prerequisites. Use to assess brand-indicator readiness in inboxes. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Look up CAA records for a domain. Shows which Certificate Authorities are authorized to issue certificates. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check DANE/TLSA certificate pinning for SMTP at port 25. Resolves the domain's MX hosts and looks up TLSA records at _25._tcp.<mx-host>, validating their syntax, usage/selector/matching-type fields and DNSSEC backing on the MX host's zone. The record is reported as present but UNVERIFIED: there is no certificate probe for port 25/SMTP, so the pinned data is never compared against the certificate the mail server actually serves (the comparable capture-and-compare pipeline exists only for check_dane_https at port 443, and is itself currently kill-switched there — see that tool's description). Use when asked if SMTP mail servers publish DANE/TLSA pinning; this does not confirm the pin matches the live certificate. For HTTPS DANE at port 443, use check_dane_https instead. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Verify DANE certificate pinning for HTTPS connections. Looks up TLSA records at _443._tcp.{domain} (port 443) and validates their syntax, usage/selector/matching-type fields and DNSSEC backing. The record is reported as present but UNVERIFIED in every deployment: comparison against the certificate the host actually serves is currently withdrawn because the operator probe vantage cannot observe the origin certificate (finding metadata notAssessedReason probe_vantage_intercepted when the probe is bound), so a stale pin is NOT detected here. Distinct from check_dane which covers SMTP at port 25. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check domain reputation against DNS-based Domain Block Lists (Spamhaus DBL, URIBL, SURBL). Returns listing status with decoded return codes.

Look up DKIM records for a domain. Probes common selectors, validates the signing algorithm used for outgoing email (RSA-1024/2048, Ed25519), and reports key strength. Use to verify that outbound email signatures are cryptographically sound. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Look up and validate the DMARC record for a domain. Shows the enforcement level (none/quarantine/reject), alignment mode (strict/relaxed), and aggregate/forensic reporting destinations. Use to determine a domain's DMARC enforcement level, whether it sends aggregate reports, or if it is protected against email impersonation — distinct from check_shadow_domains (which checks TLD variants) and assess_spoofability (composite score). Part of the scan_domain audit.

Audit the cryptographic strength of DNSKEY signing algorithms used for DNSSEC. Reports which algorithm is used for DNSSEC signing keys (RSA/SHA-1, RSA/SHA-256, ECDSA P-256, Ed25519, etc.), flags deprecated algorithms (RSA/SHA-1, DSA), independent of whether the DNSSEC chain validates. Use when asked what algorithm is used for DNSSEC signing keys, or if deprecated DNSKEY algorithms are in use. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check DNSSEC status for a domain. Verifies whether DNS is tamper-proof and protected against cache poisoning and DNS spoofing attacks by validating DNSKEY and DS records. Reports whether DNSSEC is enabled and validating. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Walk the full DNSSEC chain of trust from the DNS root down to the target domain, tracing DS/DNSKEY records and algorithm usage at each zone level. Use when asked to trace the chain of trust from the DNS root, or to see the full DNSSEC delegation path step by step.

Detect fast-flux DNS behavior: performs multiple rounds of A/AAAA queries and checks whether IP addresses are rotating rapidly on each DNS query (a sign of botnet or malicious infrastructure). Compares IP answer sets and TTLs across rounds to identify rapidly rotating infrastructure used to hide malicious activity.

Audit a domain's browser-facing HTTP security headers over HTTPS. Inspects Content-Security-Policy (flagging unsafe-inline/unsafe-eval/wildcards), X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, and the cross-origin isolation headers (COOP/COEP/CORP), and detects CDN/WAF interception. Returns per-header findings for missing or weak protections against XSS, clickjacking, and cross-origin attacks. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Inspect a domain's published /llms.txt and /llms-full.txt for links and install instructions an AI agent could inherit from someone else. Parses and dedupes the links (same-origin vs external), sweeps external link hosts for dangling CNAMEs and deprovisioned-service fingerprints (evidence of a dangling service, not proof it can be claimed), and checks package names in npm/npx/pnpm/yarn/pip/uv/pipx install commands against the npm or PyPI registry (an unregistered name is claimable) and OSV malicious-package (MAL-) advisories. Detection only; not scored. Anything not measured is listed under notAssessed.

Detect active typosquat and lookalike/homoglyph domains that impersonate your brand and could be used in phishing. Identifies character-substitution and visual-confusion domains registered by attackers. Distinct from check_shadow_domains (TLD variants with auth gaps) and discover_brand_domains (legitimate brand portfolio).

Check whether a domain enforces SMTP TLS for inbound mail via MTA-STS, protecting against downgrade attacks. Queries _mta-sts.<domain> and fetches the policy file, reports mode (enforce/testing/none) and MX coverage. Use to verify whether inbound SMTP is protected against TLS downgrade or MITM — distinct from check_dane which uses TLSA pinning. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Look up MX records for a domain. Identifies which mail servers receive inbound email for the domain and which email hosting provider is used (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Proofpoint, etc.). Use when asked which email provider hosts inbound mail for a domain, or to see MX record configuration. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check whether the mail server (MX) IP addresses are listed on spam blocklists (Spamhaus, Barracuda, SORBS, and other RBLs). Also verifies reverse DNS for MX hosts. Use when you want to know if your mail server IP is blacklisted, or if your MX is on any blocklist — distinct from check_rbl which checks a specific IP directly.

Audit a domain’s nameserver delegation and redundancy. Identifies the DNS hosting provider and, when the infrastructure probe is available, directly compares parent and child NS sets, verifies authoritative AA responses, and checks required glue addresses. Use to detect stale registrar delegations, lame nameservers, and intermittent resolution risk. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Assess zone walkability risk by analyzing NSEC3PARAM configuration. Detects plain NSEC zones, weak NSEC3 parameters, and opt-out flags.

Verify forward-confirmed reverse DNS (PTR/FCrDNS) for mail servers. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check MX server IP reputation against 6 DNS-based Real-time Blocklists (SpamCop, UCEProtect, Mailspike, Barracuda, PSBL). Resolves MX hosts to IPs first.

Check a domain against BlackVeil real-time threat intelligence (curated intel-gateway feed). Distinct from DNSBL checks. Operator-deploy only; degrades to info when unprovisioned.

Check DNS consistency across 4 public resolvers.

Query a rotating sample of 3 root servers per call and compare the priming NS set, glue, SOA serials, and cross-root consistency against the embedded official root hints. Uses BV_INFRA_PROBE when available; without it, returns the embedded hints as reference data only.

Find alternate TLD variants of a domain (e.g. example.net, example.co) that have weak or missing email authentication and could be used to spoof email. Use when asked about TLD variants with email auth gaps — distinct from check_lookalikes which detects typosquat/homoglyph impersonation domains.

Look up and validate the SPF record for a domain. Lists all IP addresses and third-party senders authorised to send email on behalf of the domain, flags syntax errors, and shows the trust surface (which mail servers are whitelisted). Use when you need to know who is permitted to send email as a domain. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Map a domain's DNS-visible service footprint by probing 19 common SRV record prefixes (email, calendar, messaging, directory, web) in parallel. Returns discovered services and flags insecure service advertisements — e.g. plaintext IMAP/POP3/LDAP without an encrypted variant. A domain with no matches among the probed prefixes is not proof the domain has no services at all. Use when asked to map DNS-visible services or flag insecure service advertisements.

Check the HTTPS/TLS posture of a domain: HTTPS reachability, HSTS policy, and HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect. Also returns certificate metadata (issuer, expiry date, days remaining, SAN count) read from public Certificate Transparency logs — this describes the most recently LOGGED certificate, which may differ from the one currently served. Origin TLS protocol support and cipher suites are not assessed; legacy-TLS detection is withdrawn because the probe cannot observe the origin handshake. Use to verify HTTPS/HSTS configuration and certificate issuer/expiry. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Detect SubdoMailing risk: analyzes the SPF include chain for dangling or hijackable subdomains that could let an attacker send email as the domain. Use when you want to know if an SPF include chain can be hijacked through a dangling domain, or to detect subdomain mailing risk hidden in SPF includes. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs pointing to deprovisioned cloud services that could be claimed by an attacker (subdomain takeover vulnerabilities). Detects 16 provider families (AWS S3/CloudFront, Azure Front Door/CDN/Blob/App Service, GCP Cloud Storage, Heroku, GitHub Pages, Vercel, Firebase, Shopify, etc.). Use when asked if subdomains are pointing to deprovisioned cloud services. Pair with discover_subdomains to widen the candidate set — note that returns a CT sample, not a full inventory.

Validate HTTPS/SVCB records (RFC 9460) for modern transport capability advertisement. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Check whether a domain has SMTP TLS Reporting (TLS-RPT) configured. Queries _smtp._tls.<domain> for the v=TLSRPTv1 record and validates its reporting destination (rua= mailto:/https:), flagging a missing record, duplicate records, or an invalid/absent reporting URI. Complements MTA-STS by giving visibility into TLS delivery failures. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Audit TXT records for stale entries and SaaS exposure.

Audit DNS zone hygiene: identifies sensitive or forgotten subdomains exposed in DNS, stale SOA records, and zone propagation issues. Use to find any sensitive subdomains that should not be publicly visible, or to audit overall DNS zone cleanliness.

Compare a domain's current security configuration against a fixed policy baseline to determine compliance. Use to check whether a domain meets a policy requirement — not for tracking improvement/regression over time (use analyze_drift) and not for comparing multiple domains (use compare_domains).

Side-by-side security comparison of 2–5 domains. Shows relative scores, category gaps, and unique weaknesses for each domain. Use when comparing your security posture against a competitor, or doing a head-to-head comparison between multiple domains.

Map domain IPs to Autonomous System Numbers via Team Cymru DNS. Returns ASN, prefix, country, registry, and organization for each IP. Flags high-risk hosting ASNs.

Permanently removes a recurring brand-audit watch by watchId. Owner-scoped — a watchId owned by another principal surfaces as notFound. Returns confirmation of deletion.

Discover all domains that belong to a brand's portfolio by aggregating certificate, DNS, redirect, and mail-policy signals. Use when asked what domains are part of a brand portfolio, or to find all domains related to a brand. Pass the EXACT seed domain verbatim — do NOT normalize or substitute a canonical domain.

Fetch the ranked candidate domains (the discovery CheckResult) for an async run started with discover_brand_domains_start. Returns notReady while the discovery is still in-flight; the discovery result once complete. Owner-scoped.

Start an async brand-domain discovery for the EXACT seed domain provided (the async sibling of discover_brand_domains, which can run ~24s and time out interactive clients). Same args as discover_brand_domains. Returns { auditId, queuedAt, etaSeconds } immediately; poll with discover_brand_domains_status and fetch ranked candidates with discover_brand_domains_findings once complete.

Poll the status of an async brand-domain discovery started with discover_brand_domains_start. Returns status (queued | running | completed | failed) and progress. Owner-scoped — operationIds owned by other principals surface as notFound.

Find subdomains of a domain using Certificate Transparency logs. Reveals shadow IT, forgotten services, and unauthorized certificate issuance. Returns a CT SAMPLE, not an asset inventory: the count is a lower bound, a host with no publicly-logged certificate never appears, and the result carries a per-source `coverage` record stating what was actually consulted. `countBasis` says whether `totalSubdomains` is the tool’s normal reach (`sample`) or a `floor` from a run whose recall was cut (then `minSubdomainsObserved` is present); `concreteSubdomains` excludes wildcard patterns.

Explain a finding with impact and remediation.

Generate a DNS/email security remediation artifact. Artifact types: spf_record (build a new SPF record), dmarc_record (create a DMARC policy), dkim_config (DKIM key setup), mta_sts_policy (generate an MTA-STS policy file), fix_plan (prioritized remediation plan for all findings), or rollout_plan (phased DMARC enforcement timeline). Use when asked to generate or create a record or policy.

Read the effective authentication context for this request: tier, owner-IP-gate disposition, a keyed pseudonymous principal reference, server version and observation time. Performs no target checks or quota/session/cache/job writes. An unavailable result is not anonymous/free fallback.

Get industry benchmark data: shows what percentile a domain's security score ranks at within its sector or country cohort, the mean score, and the most common DNS security failures across the industry. Use when asked how a score compares to the industry average, what percentile a score is in, or what the most common security failures are in an industry or sector.

Rank a domain against its country or global cohort using the GSI benchmark corpus. Accepts a domain score (from scan_domain) and optional country/sector; returns a percentile: "scores better than X% of peers". Owner-gate exempt — public cohort data only.

Get security benchmarks and common configuration issues for a specific email or DNS service-provider cohort (e.g. Google Workspace customers, Microsoft 365 customers). Use when asked how an email service provider compares to competitors on security posture, or to see typical misconfigurations for a named vendor's customers.

Returns the caller's recurring brand-audit watches: watchId, domain, interval, webhook presence, last-run time, and active state. Owner-scoped. Read-only.

Map scan findings to compliance frameworks: NIST 800-177, PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, CIS Controls. Shows pass/fail/partial status per control.

Map DNS-visible third-party service dependencies for a domain. Correlates SPF, NS, TXT verifications, SRV services, and CAA records to reveal which third-party vendors can send email as the domain, control DNS, or access integrated services. Use when asked to map third-party or supply-chain dependencies — not for listing who can send email (use check_spf for that).

Start an async OSINT investigation for a domain. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.

Start an async OSINT investigation for an email address (breach exposure, account correlation). Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.

Start an async deep-infrastructure OSINT investigation for a query (domain, IP, or org). Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status.

Start an async supply-chain OSINT investigation for a query. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status.

Start an async OSINT investigation for a username (cross-platform presence, breach correlation). Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.

Retrieve the final report of a completed OSINT investigation by investigationId. For a deep_infrastructure investigation the report also composes discover_subdomains for the target (a cached CT sample under `ctDiscovery`, never an inventory). Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned or not yet complete.

Poll the status of an OSINT investigation by investigationId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns current status (running | completed | failed) and progress metadata.

Rank a brand’s portfolio (or an explicit domain set) into prioritized registrar-partner sales leads by product-gap value × severity. Multi-domain, paid. Reuses map_registrar_products per domain, then ranks. Distinct from map_registrar_products (per-domain product mapping) and batch_scan (raw scores).

Fetch domain registration data via RDAP (modern WHOIS replacement). Returns the domain registrar (the company the domain was registered with), registrant contact, creation/expiration dates, EPP status codes, and domain age. Use when asked who registered the domain, who the registrar is, or when the registration expires — distinct from check_ns which identifies the DNS nameserver provider.

Creates a recurring brand-audit watch for a domain on a daily/weekly/monthly cadence. Each run enqueues a fresh brand_audit_batch_start and (when a webhook is configured) POSTs a diff webhook on classification drift. Returns the new watchId. Owner-scoped; per-principal cap of 20 active watches.

Trace the full SPF include chain for a domain. Recursively resolves all includes, shows lookup count, tree depth, and flags circular includes or exceeding the 10-lookup limit.

Retrieve findings from a completed cloud-bucket discovery scan by scanId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. The scanId is required so reads can be owner-scoped; target and provider filters are optional.

Start an async cloud-bucket discovery scan for a target domain. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns a scanId immediately — poll progress with scan_buckets_status and retrieve results with scan_buckets_findings.

Poll the status of a cloud-bucket discovery scan by scanId. Operator-deploy only; targets must be operator-authorized on the recon watchlist; degrades to info when unprovisioned. Returns scan status (running | completed | failed) and progress metadata.

Run a full DNS and email security audit for a single domain. Aggregates every scan-included check in parallel (SPF, DKIM, DMARC, DNSSEC, TLS/SSL, MTA-STS, CAA, BIMI, subdomain takeover, and more) and returns an overall security score, NIST-aligned letter grade (6-band A+/A/B/C/D/F), maturity stage, and prioritized findings. Use for a comprehensive single-domain audit, to get a domain's overall security grade, or to assess email security maturity. Version stamps: 'scoringModelVersion' is the scoring POLICY semver (changes only when weights/thresholds/severities change, so it advances slowly) and is INDEPENDENT of — never comparable to — 'dnsChecksPackageVersion', the @blackveil/dns-checks npm engine-package version, which moves every release; a lower model version is expected, not a version gap. When citing a score, record 'scoringConfigHash' — it identifies the exact scoring configuration that produced the result.

Answer, for ONE domain, whether it meets the New Zealand Secure Government Email (SGE) requirements agencies must satisfy by October 2026. Reports all seven SGE controls — DMARC p=reject, SPF -all, DKIM, SMTP transport TLS, MTA-STS enforce, TLS-RPT, full sub-domain coverage — each as satisfied, not satisfied, or NOT MEASURED, with the structured evidence behind every verdict. Neither SMTP transport TLS nor sub-domain coverage can be observed from a single domain scan, so a DNS-only result tops out at INDETERMINATE, which is not a pass. Distinct from map_compliance, which maps findings to NIST/PCI/SOC 2/CIS.

Analyze current DNS posture and enumerate specific attack paths an adversary could exploit, with severity, feasibility, steps, and mitigations.

Re-check a specific security control after applying a fix, to confirm the finding is now resolved. Use only when a fix has already been applied and you want to verify or confirm the remediation was successful — not for initial inspection of a record.